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Government strategies to promote social protec-tion and agricultural development in Ethiopia are closely intertwined. Interventions such as the 
government’s Food Security Programme attempt to both 
protect and promote rural livelihoods. However, tensions 
exist within and between Ethiopia’s existing social protec-
tion and agricultural policies. Smallholder farming, the 
dominant livelihood activity for most Ethiopians, is 
assumed to be the source of Ethiopia’s future economic 
growth while at the same time the government’s land 
policies constitute a ‘poverty trap’. Also, to protect farmers 
facing food insecurity, the government has initiated a 
Productive Safety Net Programme (PSNP), which delivers 
predictable public works employment as well as cash 
transfers, rather than emergency food aid. However, poor 
seasonal timing of public works projects constrains agri-
cultural production. This paper explores these synergies 
and trade-offs between agricultural and social protection 
policies for Ethiopian smallholders. The paper also high-
lights recent social protection innovations – such as 
weather-indexed insurance and the Ethiopian Commodity 
Exchange – which show encouraging promise of reducing 
vulnerability while also promoting agriculture growth 
for smallholders.
Introduction
Agriculture and social protection in Ethiopia are inextri-
cably interconnected. Smallholder farming is the domi-
nant livelihood activity for the majority of Ethiopians, 
but it is also the major source of vulnerability to poverty, 
food insecurity and their often fatal consequences – 
chronic malnutrition, premature mortality, recurrent 
famines. Ethiopian farmers have been the recipients of 
enormous volumes of food aid and other humanitarian 
assistance over recent decades, to such an extent that 
emergency relief has become institutionalised within 
government structures and donor agency country 
programmes.
The discourse surrounding the complex relationship 
between agriculture and social protection in Ethiopia 
can be approached from either perspective. From the 
agricultural policy perspective, the government’s 
unshakeable belief in the centrality of farming as the 
backbone and potential source of growth for the 
Ethiopian economy is mirrored by its almost ideological 
view that land is the ultimate ‘safety net’ for rural house-
holds, who should therefore be protected against losing 
their access to land – by being prevented from selling it. 
From the social protection perspective, awareness that 
able-bodied farmers are the main ‘beneficiaries’ of safety 
nets and humanitarian food aid has fuelled the govern-
ment’s visceral fear of creating ‘dependency’ in rural 
communities, which in turn explains the predominance 
of public works projects as their preferred delivery mech-
anism for food aid, as well as recent shifts in safety net 
thinking towards cash transfers rather than food aid, with 
predictable multi-annual transfers expected to lead to 
‘graduation’ within a defined time period. 
The discourse on agriculture and social protection (or 
‘safety nets’) in Ethiopia might start at a high level of 
ideological rhetoric and theoretical abstraction, but it 
plays itself out in real-world policy choices that attempt 
to find a balance between maximising opportunities and 
minimising risks. This policy dilemma can be succinctly 
stated: in a high-risk environment, should you adopt 
conservative strategies that minimise risk but keep 
people poor, or push aggressively for growth and ‘grow 
your way out of poverty’? In the past, the Government 
has apparently been satisfied with the former approach, 
but recent policy statements, specifically the ‘Plan for 
Accelerated and Sustained Development to End Poverty’ 
(PASDEP), signalled its impatience with the evident failure 
of this strategy, and embarked on a significant and ambi-
tious shift towards agricultural commercialisation for 
income generation and wealth creation at household 
and national levels. Adopted around the same time, the 
‘Productive Safety Net Programme’ (PSNP) represents an 
impatience with decades of food aid that have failed 
even to sustain rural Ethiopians in their poverty, let alone 
generated growth, food security and poverty reduction. 
In a two-pronged attack on rural poverty in Ethiopia, 
therefore, the PSNP injects cash into a moribund agrarian 
economy, while PASDEP promotes market chains and 
export crops that will generate further cash income. This 
is a major move away from a ‘survivalist’ preoccupation 
with growing food for subsistence and delivering food 
aid for survival when food production is inadequate.
This paper explores the linkages between social 
protection interventions and support to small farmer 
development in Ethiopia. The paper is divided into six 
main sections. Following this Introduction, Section 2 
argues that agricultural policies and social protection 
policies in Ethiopia have become increasingly convergent 
and synergistic in recent years. Section 3 explores the 
paradoxical relationship of small farmers to land, which 
is regarded by the government not only as a key produc-
tive asset but also as a fundamental ‘safety net’, but could 
also be interpreted as contributing to the ‘poverty trap’ 
that millions of Ethiopians find themselves in. Section 4 
briefly reviews recent developments in agricultural policy 
in Ethiopia, focusing on the recent drive for agricultural 
commercialisation as encapsulated in the shift from ‘ADLI’ 
to ‘PASDEP’. Section 5 analyses the components of the 
‘Food Security Programme’ in detail, with empirical 
evidence of the impact of the Productive Safety Net 
Programme (PSNP) on agriculture. Section 6 discusses 
recent innovative interventions that build linkages 
between social protection and agriculture, such as 
weather-indexed drought insurance and the design of 
an ‘integrated drought risk management plan’ and a 
commodity exchange for Ethiopia. Section 7 
concludes.
Agriculture and social 
protection in Ethiopia: 
complementarity or 
convergence?
The Government of Ethiopia’s policies for agriculture 
and social protection follow a trajectory that can be 
interpreted as a kind of convergence. In the past, policies 
of ‘agricultural promotion’ and interventions that might 
now be labelled ‘social protection’ were more or less 
distinct, linked only by the fact that social protection – or 
more accurately, safety nets or humanitarian relief – was 
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triggered as a response to agricultural failure. When 
harvests failed, safety nets intervened to protect farming 
families against the severest consequences. This sequen-
tial separation can be conceptualised as a ‘seasonal policy 
timeline’, with agricultural policy (such as inputs provi-
sion) delivered during the farming season and safety nets 
(typically food aid or food-for-work) delivered during the 
‘hungry season’ several months later. In this sense, agri-
cultural policy and social protection policy are mirror 
images: the more effectively farming fills household 
granaries, the smaller the annual appeal for humanitarian 
assistance, but several million Ethiopians need ‘emer-
gency relief’ for several months every year to see them 
through to the next harvest, and in years of catastrophic 
crop failure this figure rises to 12 or 14 million.
Terminology matters: the phrase ‘social protection’ is 
not yet current in Ethiopia, perhaps because of its close 
association with ‘social welfare’ – and by extension, 
‘dependency’ – to which the government is strongly 
opposed because it believes in self-reliance at household 
and community levels, especially in rural areas where 
most people are either farming or have relatives farming 
or otherwise working for them. Instead, Ethiopia has 
decades of experience with ‘safety nets’, signifying transi-
tory support mechanisms of last resort (rather than insti-
tutionalised permanent welfare systems), and more 
recently it has introduced ‘productive safety nets’ (as 
discussed below), emphasising the synergies that the 
government aims to achieve between ‘livelihood protec-
tion’ and ‘livelihood promotion’.
There have been some unintended negative interac-
tions between the two sets of interventions. For instance, 
public works projects are often implemented during the 
months leading up to the next harvest – at the peak of 
the hungry season, but also at the peak of the farming 
season. The competition for household labour between 
public works and the household farm often forces farmers 
to neglect their fields, compromising the next harvest 
and perpetuating the cycle of agricultural under-perfor-
mance and rural food insecurity. The main policy response 
has been to tinker with design and implementation 
modalities: mainly to try to time public works better, and 
there have been suggestions (not yet implemented to 
our knowledge) that works should be undertaken before 
the farming season starts, with payments deferred until 
the ‘hungry season’. (This was proposed as long ago as 
1993, in the Directives in support of the National Policy 
on Disaster Prevention and Management: “coupons, in 
lieu of wages, could be redeemed immediately or at a 
future date”.) A more radical recommendation would be 
to de-link the delivery of social protection from any 
labour requirement altogether. The asset creation bene-
fits of public works are too inadequate to justify the 
conscription of cheap labour, while the poorest and most 
vulnerable households are typically labour-constrained, 
rather than underemployed with ‘surplus labour’ to allo-
cate to public works.
More recently, the positive linkages between agricul-
tural policy and social protection policy have become 
increasingly recognised, in general and in Ethiopia, and 
there are attempts in many countries to achieve synergies 
between the two. But recognition that positive linkages 
might exist is not new. Thinking on ‘linking relief and 
development’ in Ethiopia since the early 1990s has 
concentrated on efforts to generate agricultural growth 
through safety nets, by using public works programmes 
to simultaneously transfer food rations (a classic 
‘consumption smoothing’ safety net objective) and also 
(in theory) to construct useful economic infrastructure 
such as roads (to integrate markets for farmers and 
traders), or to subsidise agricultural activities such as 
vegetable gardens (promoting production of secondary 
food crops for both consumption and sale).
Faced with ‘low input, low output’ agriculture, it might 
seem logical for policy-makers to assume that farmers 
face binding input constraints, and that the solution from 
both an agricultural and a social protection perspective 
lies in the intensification of smallholder production to 
maximise yields from small plots of farmland. This 
thinking underpins many interventions that can be 
described as ‘productivity-enhancing safety nets’ 
(Devereux 1999), such as Sasakawa Global 2000, which 
delivers fertiliser and seeds to farmers on a revolving 
credit basis and has had some success in raising crop 
yields in some places – including parts of Ethiopia – at 
some times. Unfortunately, revolving credit schemes 
depend on reliable repayment and do not cope well with 
variability in production and repayments. Global 2000 
projects are prone to collapse whenever a bad harvest 
undermines farmers’ ability to repay their loans. In 
Ethiopia, a perverse outcome occurred in the 1990s, 
when farmers were encouraged to take on inputs pack-
ages as loans, and were actually imprisoned when 
drought shocks left them unable to repay these loans 
after a failed harvest. This experience raises broader ques-
tions about the logic of providing social assistance or 
income-generating support to poor households in the 
form of (even zero-interest) loans, which could simply 
leave them indebted and worse off than before – another 
example of a ‘negative synergy’ between agricultural and 
social protection objectives.
In fact, efforts at achieving synergies in both directions 
(promoting agricultural growth in Ethiopia through 
‘productivity-enhancing’ safety nets, or achieving social 
protection through risk-reducing agriculture) have been 
persistently compromised by the instability of the natural 
environment, especially fluctuations in rainfall on which 
smallholder agriculture depends. Neither investments 
in agriculture nor investments in social protection appear 
capable of dealing with this risk. Irrigation might seem 
a logical way to proceed, but the scale of the need is so 
vast and the available moisture in the highlands is so 
low that large-scale irrigation has never emerged as a 
realistic option, though it is repeatedly recommended.
‘Land politics’ and social 
protection in Ethiopia
Successive Ethiopian regimes have located the source 
of Ethiopia’s economic stagnation and vulnerability in 
the agriculture sector, yet they have also looked to small-
holder agriculture as the potential source of economic 
growth, household and national food security and 
poverty reduction. In 2000, Prime Minister Meles Zenawi 
captured this ambivalence succinctly when he said: “The 
agricultural sector remains our Achilles heel and source 
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of vulnerability. Nonetheless, we remain convinced that 
agricultural based development remains the only source 
of hope for Ethiopia.” At the heart of this ambivalence is 
the politics of land.
The overthrow of Emperor Haile Selassie following 
the 1974 famine signalled the abrupt ending of an essen-
tially feudal system in Ethiopian agriculture. Colonel 
Mengistu’s Derg regime believed that unequal landhold-
ings and exploitative labour relations based on share-
cropping explained Ethiopia’s persistent vulnerability to 
famine, as well as constituting a gross social injustice. 
The Derg military dictatorship used its unfettered power 
to force a radical agrarian transformation on rural 
Ethiopia. Between 1976 and 1991, all farmland in the 
highlands was confiscated by the state and redistributed 
equally per capita within rural communities. This radical 
land redistribution was motivated by both egalitarian 
and efficiency concerns. The intention was not only to 
break the power of the landlords over the peasants, but 
to give all rural households the means to achieve sustain-
able increases in agricultural productivity and rural 
incomes (Devereux et al., 2005).
Importantly, land was conceptualised as a safety net 
for rural households by the Derg (a view that is shared 
by Meles Zenawi’s EPRDF government). As long as rural 
families enjoyed guaranteed access to land, they retained 
the potential to generate a subsistence livelihood, and 
in this sense the Derg’s land redistribution can be seen 
as a crude form of social protection. Motivated by its 
socialist egalitarian ideology, the Derg also implemented 
agricultural policies such as state farms, villagisation and 
forced resettlement, all of which failed to generate the 
intended growth in agricultural productivity and were 
later abandoned. It is no coincidence that the Derg 
presided over an even worse famine, in 1984, than the 
famine of 1974 that had paved its accession to power. 
The land redistribution remains as the Derg’s lasting 
impact on Ethiopian agriculture.
After the Derg was overthrown in 1991, the EPRDF 
government under Prime Minister Meles Zenawi reaf-
firmed the Derg’s commitment to land equality, and 
Meles has vociferously resisted suggestions that a land 
market should be encouraged to emerge in rural areas. 
Although the current regime is more market-oriented, 
Western-aligned and democratic than its predecessors, 
Meles insists that land is special and should not be 
commercially transacted. The argument is that allowing 
smallholders to sell their farmland converts this essential 
livelihood input into a liquid asset that would inevitably 
be monetised through ‘distress sales’ for food during 
crises such as drought, forcing millions of small farmers 
off the land, concentrating farmland in the hands of a 
minority of rich landowners, reviving quasi-feudal labour 
relations in agriculture, and displacing rural poverty into 
urban slums. So the privatisation of land rights is resisted 
on the grounds that land provides a vital and irreplace-
able ‘productive safety net’ to poor rural Ethiopians.
Yet despite the land reform, it remains the case that 
agricultural livelihoods in Ethiopia are among the most 
precarious in the world, with major livelihood shocks 
guaranteed every few years. In this context, given the 
tiny landholdings that most rural families have been 
allocated, it is debatable whether the non-transferability 
of land rights constitutes a ‘safety net’ or a ‘poverty trap’. 
Certainly, a wealth of evidence from many countries 
confirms that pro-poor land redistribution can boost 
agricultural productivity and raise the incomes of house-
holds that receive land (Eastwood et al., 2004:2). On the 
other hand, recent thinking and empirical work on ‘asset 
thresholds’ reveals that households with inadequate 
access to key productive assets (eg landholdings that 
are too small) may be unable to accumulate assets and 
grow their way out of poverty. Even worse, where liveli-
hoods are subject to recurrent shocks, such as droughts 
in Ethiopia, ‘asset poverty’ will be perpetuated as house-
holds repeatedly sell off non-land assets for food, 
becoming chronically dependent on emergency relief 
for their survival (Carter and Barrett, 2007). In such 
contexts, land redistribution might only have served to 
‘equalise poverty’ and to entrench agricultural stagna-
tion, while prohibitions on land sales might be trapping 
millions of families in unviable livelihoods. What might 
be needed instead is consolidation of fragmented land-
holdings into larger, economically profitable units, plus 
facilitating livelihood diversification for asset-poor fami-
lies that will never be able to make a sustainable living 
from their ‘starvation plots’ – in Dessalegn Rahmato’s 
pithy phrase (Devereux et al., 2005). In 2001, half of all 
smallholder households in drought-prone Wollo and 
Tigray were farming less than half a hectare (Berhanu 
and Samuel, 2002: 35).
Land redistribution has also been identified as contrib-
uting to another source of rising vulnerability and 
increasing needs for formal social protection in rural 
Ethiopia, namely, the decline of informal social protection 
in poor rural communities, especially those where the 
‘equalisation of poverty’ has severed the patron-client 
relationships that tied poorer and wealthier families 
together, in ways that were certainly exploitative but 
equally certainly ensured that the ‘client’ had a ‘patron’ 
to turn to for assistance in times of crisis. A livelihoods 
survey in Wollo found that land redistribution together 
with other economic and demographic stressors has 
precipitated a collapse in better-off groups within agri-
culture-based communities since the 1990s, which has 
contributed to both rising vulnerability and agricultural 
stagnation, because poorer families can no longer rely 
on wealthier neighbours for access to productive 
resources such as oxen for ploughing, or for informal 
social assistance during difficult times (Devereux et al., 
2003).
Agricultural development 
strategies in Ethiopia
Given Ethiopia’s history of chronic food insecurity and 
recurrent catastrophic famines, it is hardly surprising that 
food security has always featured strongly as a priority 
in successive Government development plans and strate-
gies. The most significant policy statements of recent 
years have included ‘Agriculture Development-Led 
Industrialisation’ (ADLI), the ‘Sustainable Development 
and Poverty Reduction Programme’ (SDPRP), and the 
‘Plan for Accelerated and Sustained Development to End 
Poverty’ (PASDEP). Significant programmes that support 
agriculture but also have social protection aspects 
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include the ‘Food Security Programme’ (FSP) and its flag-
ship component, the ‘Productive Safety Net Programme’ 
(PSNP).
Ethiopia’s current Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper 
(PRSP), known as PASDEP, for the period 2005–2009, takes 
forward a number of the same measures emphasised in 
its predecessor, the SDPRP, which prioritised food secu-
rity, rural development, human development, and 
capacity building. However, PASDEP does introduce some 
new emphases, perhaps the most significant being a 
push for the commercialisation of agriculture as a strategy 
for stimulating broad-based economic growth.
PASDEP’s thrust toward large-scale agricultural 
commercialisation represents a departure from the 
Agriculture Development-Led Industrialisation (ADLI) 
strategy, which saw small farmers as drivers of growth 
in agriculture and the wider economy (Amdissa Teshome, 
2006). PASDEP outlines a strategy for large-scale commer-
cialisation with a strong export focus, emphasising crop 
diversification beyond coffee to include other high-value 
niche markets, including floriculture, horticulture and 
spice production. Crops that receive special attention 
will be cultivated in specific agro-ecological zones where 
their productivity can be maximised, and irrigation will 
be utilised where feasible. PASDEP aims to double agri-
cultural production in Ethiopia in five years, with conse-
quent improvements in smallholder incomes and 
Ethiopia’s foreign exchange earnings. In contrast to the 
preoccupation of earlier policies with achieving food 
production self-sufficiency, there is a strong emphasis 
on marketing of produce, with farmers exhorted to aim 
higher than mere subsistence. “The farming community 
should abandon the traditional system of agricultural 
production and adopt market-oriented approach and 
promote efficient system of marketing that encourage 
both sellers and buyers” (Government of Ethiopia, 
2007: 105). PASDEP’s approach is consistent with the 
strategy outlined in the 2008 World Development Report 
on Agriculture, which argues for the development of 
market chains and expansion of export crops for agri-
cultural-based economies (World Bank, 2007).
Ethiopia’s Food Security 
Programme
In addition to its focus on agricultural commercialisation, 
PASDEP renews the Government of Ethiopia’s commit-
ment to the Food Security Programme (FSP), which was 
initiated by the ‘New Coalition for Food Security’ after 
the food crisis of 2002. The FSP aims to address food 
insecurity through a $3 billion package of interventions 
that are intended to boost agricultural productivity for 
the estimated 8.3 million chronically (or ‘predictably’) 
food insecure, and to provide protection against agri-
cultural vulnerability for the estimated 6.7 million transi-
tory (‘unpredictably’) food insecure Ethiopians. The Food 
Security Programme has three main components, which 
together are designed to attain household food security 
over a five-year period: (1) the ‘Productive Safety Net 
Programme’, with two sub-components – Public Works 
and Direct Support – which bridges food gaps with cash 
or food transfers while building community assets; (2) 
‘Household Extension Packages’, which support a range 
of non-farm livelihood activities; (2) ‘Voluntary 
Resettlement Programme’, which relocates people from 
the most vulnerable highland communities to more 
productive land. In terms of the World Bank’s ‘social risk 
management’ terminology (Holzmann and Kozel, 2007), 
resettlement and extension packages are instruments 
of risk reduction, while social transfers (‘direct support’) 
contribute to risk coping and public works has elements 
of risk reduction, risk mitigation and risk coping, depending 
on what kinds of public works activities are 
undertaken.
Productive Safety Net Programme (PSNP)
The Productive Safety Net Programme is the largest social 
protection scheme in Africa outside of South Africa’s 
social grants schemes. The PSNP delivers social transfers 
to some eight million Ethiopians each year, either through 
‘public works’ activities or as ‘direct support’ for house-
holds that are labour-constrained, with three distinct 
objectives:
smoothing food consumption •  in chronically food 
insecure smallholder households, by transferring food 
or cash to buy food during the ‘hunger gap’ months;
protecting household assets •  by avoiding damaging 
‘coping strategies’ such as selling productive assets or 
taking on high-interest loans to buy food;
building community assets •  by selecting public works 
activities that create infrastructure with developmental 
potential (eg feeder roads).
These objectives correspond to the three functions 
of ‘protection’, ‘prevention’ and ‘promotion’, as identified 
in some conceptual frameworks of social protection (see 
Figure 1, which illustrates social protection as an ‘upside-
down traffic light’, from red for crisis to green for 
growth).
Figure 1 Objectives of Ethiopia’s Productive Safety Net 
Programme
Promotion
(of livelihoods)
PSNP objective #3:
Building community assets
Prevention (of 
impoverishment)
PSNP objective #2:
Protecting household assets
Protection
(against hunger)
PSNP objective #1:
Smoothing food consumption
In terms of the linkages between social protection 
and agriculture, the ‘promotion’ component is most 
relevant, and this is also a crucial (self-imposed) indicator 
of success for the Government of Ethiopia, which intends 
to ‘graduate’ PSNP participants out of the programme 
within five years of implementation. Importantly, liveli-
hood promotion and graduation are to be achieved 
primarily through linkages with ‘Other Food Security 
Programmes’, especially the ‘Household Extension 
Packages’ that generate complementary streams of 
income for farming families. This is because it is recog-
nised that small transfers of cash or food are more likely 
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to be consumed than invested, while the assets 
constructed by the public works activities will contribute 
to an improved enabling environment (eg feeder roads 
will stimulate trade and integrate fragmented markets) 
rather than directly generating additional income. 
Similarly, the Voluntary Resettlement Programme aims 
to ‘graduate’ participating households off chronic depen-
dence on food aid by providing access to more and better 
land, plus a package of inputs and services, that are 
intended to ensure that these households attain food 
production self-sufficiency fairly soon after being 
resettled.
It follows that the success of the PSNP in terms of 
graduation outcomes should be evaluated only in 
conjunction with these complementary programmes. 
The PSNP itself should be evaluated primarily in terms 
of whether it smoothed household food consumption 
and protected household assets. The available evidence 
for both these effects is significant and positive. 
In terms of smoothing food consumption, a survey of 
960 households in eight PSNP districts in 2006 found 
that 88% of households that received food from the PSNP 
consumed all this food, while 7% sold some – often to 
buy other food – and consumed the rest, and a few house-
holds gave some of their PSNP food to others (usually 
family members). Among recipients of cash from the 
PSNP, 88% used some or all of this cash to buy staple 
food, and 11% bought other food. Three-quarters of PSNP 
households reported consuming more food, or better 
quality food, since the programme started (Devereux 
et al., 2006: 46). Comparing expenditure patterns of the 
two categories of PSNP participants, cash recipients spent 
significantly more on food than food recipients, which 
is consistent with expectations, since the cash transfers 
were primarily intended to ensure access to food for 
farming households that did not produce enough food 
and did not receive food aid in 2005/06.
In terms of asset protection, our survey found that 
non-participants in the programme were more likely than 
participants to experience falls in their asset-holdings 
during the 2005/06 agricultural year. Much of this asset 
depletion was attributed to sales of livestock to buy food. 
Conversely, 62% of PSNP households reported being 
effectively protected against ‘distress sales’ of assets for 
essential purchases, while 23% even increased their asset 
ownership over the year. However, many PSNP house-
holds were forced to sell some of their assets, draw down 
their limited savings, or even rent out farmland, to survive 
the ‘hungry season’. Sales of productive assets such as 
land rights are especially concerning because they 
compromise the future viability of agriculture-based 
livelihoods. So the objective of preventing further impov-
erishment of the most vulnerable farming families was 
only partially achieved, probably because the transfers 
were too small (the average contribution of PSNP cash 
to total household expenditure was just 12%), and often 
delivered too late, to fully cover household food deficits. 
It is also true that asset-holdings of PSNP participants 
were lower initially, which is an indicator that the 
programme was well targeted (Devereux et al., 
2006: 17).
In terms of promoting agricultural livelihoods, at least 
two clear linkages can be identified between the PSNP 
and agriculture, one direct and one indirect.
Direct linkage: •  public works activities that support 
agricultural production;
Indirect linkage: •  investment of PSNP transfers in agri-
cultural production.
The first linkage is a programme design effect; the 
second is a household behavioural effect. The success 
of the first depends on the quality and appropriateness 
of the public works activities. The success of the second 
depends on individual household choices – how many 
households decide to invest how much transfer income 
in their farming enterprises, with what impact on 
production.
Direct linkages – PSNP public works
Public works has a long history in Ethiopia, partly because 
the Government, fearing dependency, has always resisted 
free handouts in favour of making people work – even 
for emergency relief – and partly because the massive 
infrastructure deficits in rural Ethiopia are blamed for 
contributing to food insecurity, and public works mobi-
lises a massive supply of unskilled labour that can be 
conscripted at low cost into building or maintaining rural 
roads and other physical infrastructure. The Employment 
Generation Scheme (EGS) and ‘Project 2488’ were enor-
mous food-for-work programmes, run largely with World 
Food Programme support, that pursued both consump-
tion smoothing and asset creation objectives, but were 
critiqued especially for failing to leave behind assets that 
were maintained and generated sustainable benefits for 
local communities.
The PSNP continues this tradition of delivering social 
transfers with a heavy work requirement to able-bodied 
Ethiopians; the main difference being that cash-for-work 
was offered in many (but not all) communities instead 
of food-for-work. Most of the activities that are imple-
mented under the PSNP Public Works Programme are 
familiar from the earlier food-for-work projects, and many 
of these have the potential to promote agricultural 
production or marketing, directly or indirectly. Activities 
that benefit agriculture directly, by either raising or stabi-
lising crop yields and farmers’ incomes, include small-scale 
irrigation, micro-dams, and soil and water conservation. 
Activities that could enhance agricultural incomes indi-
rectly include construction of rural access roads and 
farmers’ training centres, and improved water supplies 
(spring capping, ponds, shallow wells). Many other activi-
ties, such as construction of social infrastructure (school 
classrooms, health posts) have no immediate income-
generating potential, though rural families should benefit 
from improved education and health in the future, since 
these are investments in human capital.
The Government commissioned a review of the PSNP 
Public Works Programme in 2006, which found that the 
programme faced many of the same problems that 
undermined the effectiveness of previous public works 
activities in Ethiopia. These “constraints and challenges” 
included:
inadequate coordination and monitoring, untimely 
delivery of resources, high turnover of staff, inad-
equate assignment of personnel, lack of timely 
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planning and implementation, inadequate tech-
nical support to field staff, inadequate supply of 
tools and equipment, low level of technical skills 
of field staff” (Government of Ethiopia 2006: 1).
As a consequence, most of the assets that have been 
constructed under PSNP public works failed to meet 
minimum technical standards, with the roads, irrigation 
and water supply projects being particularly problematic. 
There are variations across localities, reflecting regional 
differences in implementation capacity, but the general 
impression is that insufficient attention is being paid to 
the quality and maintenance of public works assets, prob-
ably because the objective of transferring cash or food 
to poor people was the dominant priority of the PSNP, 
while the infrastructure creation or asset-building objec-
tive was secondary. This raises a familiar concern about 
whether it is appropriate to load multiple objectives onto 
a single instrument, given the evidence from various 
contexts that this often results in all objectives being 
compromised. No attempt has been made to quantify 
any agricultural or income gains that might be attribut-
able to public works activities, but our expectation is 
that these impacts are likely to be negligible.
Indirect linkages – investment of PSNP transfers
In terms of the indirect linkage with agriculture – house-
holds choosing to spend some transfer income on 
farming – it is argued that the disbursement of regular 
and predictable transfers over an extended period of 
time will enable households to plan their spending more 
effectively, including saving some portion of each 
monthly transfer until they can purchase, say, a bag of 
fertiliser or some seeds. This predictability of transfers, 
reinforced by a shift away from food to cash transfers, is 
expected to generate a larger impact on production than 
occasional and unpredictable transfers of food.
The motivation for introducing cash rather than food 
transfers on the PSNP is a widely-held belief in Ethiopian 
policy circles that decades of food aid have generated 
‘vicious cycles’ of dependency and disincentives to 
producers and traders in rural Ethiopia, which predictable 
cash transfers will displace with ‘virtuous cycles’ of 
productive investment, asset accumulation, market 
stimulation and employment multipliers. “Through the 
provision of cash transfers rather than food, the 
programme will enable smallholders to increase 
consumption and investment levels and stimulate the 
development of rural markets” (DFID 2005: 1). (In fact, 
recent empirical work has challenged the popular percep-
tion that food aid in Ethiopia has generated dependency 
and disincentives, which suggests that food aid can not 
be blamed for contributing to the under-performance 
of Ethiopian agriculture, but this is a separate debate 
that will not be examined here.)
Our survey findings on investment of PSNP cash trans-
fers in agriculture reveals that more than one in ten 
households (88 of 768 participants =11.5%) purchased 
seeds while a smaller number (26 participants = 3.4%) 
purchased fertiliser. Disaggregating these outcomes by 
income quintiles, poorer and wealthier households were 
equally inclined to buy seeds, but most of the fertiliser 
(which is much more expensive) was purchased by the 
upper wealth groups. Interestingly, more than half of the 
households that purchased livestock using PSNP cash 
(50 participants = 6.5%) were in the bottom two quintiles 
(Table 1), possibly because poorer families took this 
opportunity to start rearing animals whereas wealthier 
households already owned animals.
One reason why investment in agriculture is relatively 
low is that the value of the cash transfer is low and, in 
terms of food, highly variable across seasons and loca-
tions, but generally declining over time. Given ‘Engel’s 
law’, that poor people will spend at least 60% of any 
incremental income on food, their disposable cash 
transfer income after food and other basic needs have 
been met is negligible (unless the PSNP is badly targeted, 
in which case people who spend most of their cash trans-
fers on investment probably should not have received 
cash transfers at all). As the value of PSNP cash transfers 
has fallen, due to steady food price rises – averaging 10% 
per annum in Ethiopia (Alderman et al., 2006) – that have 
not been matched by increases in cash transfers, so 
households have presumably allocated ever greater 
proportions of this income to purchasing food and other 
essentials, leaving less and less for investment or asset 
accumulation. Partly as a consequence of the failure of 
PSNP cash transfers to maintain a constant purchasing 
power, an estimated 1.8 million PSNP cash recipients 
reverted to food transfers during 2006, and our survey 
evidence (reported above) confirms that most food trans-
fers are consumed rather than monetised or bartered, 
so the investment effects of PSNP transfers are likely to 
have fallen among households that switched away from 
cash and back to food.
On the other hand, it must be noted that food price 
rises are ambiguous for smallholders. For net producers 
(those who produce marketable surpluses) rising prices 
signify rising incomes from crop sales, and are therefore 
to be welcomed. For net consumers (farmers who fail to 
meet their subsistence needs from the farm and must 
purchase some food from the market), rising food prices 
are potentially devastating and are a major cause of 
Use of cash
Poorest      Richest
1 2 3 4 5
Agriculture: seeds 15 (17.1%) 16 (18.2%) 27 (30.7%) 17 (19.3%) 13 (14.8%)
Agriculture: fertiliser 1   (3.9%) 6 (23.1%) 11 (42.3%) 3 (11.5%) 5 (19.2%)
Livestock purchase 9 (18.0%) 21 (42.0%) 13 (26.0%) 4   (8.0%) 3   (6.0%)
Business investment 2 (33.3%) 2 (33.3%) 2 (33.3%) 0   (0.0%) 0   (0.0%)
Debt repayment 23 (24.7%) 22 (23.7%) 22 (23.7%) 11 (11.8%) 15 (16.1%)
Education expenses 13 (14.1%) 26  (28.3%) 21 (22.8%) 13 (14.1%) 19 (20.7%)
Source: Devereux et al. (2006: 46)
Table 1. Investment uses of PSNP cash transfers for investment, by income quintile
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hunger and malnutrition throughout rural Africa. So 
rising food prices are generally good for agriculture but 
bad for food security, since they increase the resources 
that poor people must find to purchase the food they 
need. High or rising food prices also raise the require-
ments for social protection or humanitarian relief.
Household Extension Packages (HEP)
Household Extension Packages (HEP) are intended to 
assist participants in the Productive Safety Net Programme 
(PSNP) to increase their assets and incomes, through a 
variety of assets and inputs packages for agricultural and 
non-agricultural activities. Households select from a 
menu of 12 packages that range from livestock assets (a 
young ox plus sheep and goats), through to fodder for 
livestock fattening plus improved vegetable seeds plus 
tillage equipment plus a treadle pump or a donkey cart, 
to alternative livelihood packages such as beehives or 
silkworm raising kits. The average package is valued at 
1,500 Birr and is repayable at zero interest over 2-4 years 
(Vaitla, 2006b). However, in Tigray HEPs are much larger 
(up to 3,800 Birr) with one package comprising five sheep 
and two beehives with colonies (Slater et al., 2006).
This is a two-pronged approach: social protection is 
provided in the form of social transfers on the PSNP 
(usually with a work requirement on public works), while 
household incomes and assets are boosted through the 
extension packages. Conceptually, the two prongs rein-
force each other: although the packages are provided 
on credit, the knowledge that predictable transfers are 
also provided for up to 5 years should give households 
confidence to take on the loans. Unfortunately, in practice 
this thinking is undermined by two factors: firstly, budget 
constraints and political pressure to ‘graduate’ partici-
pants off the PSNP means that retargeting occurs 
frequently and social transfers are not guaranteed for 
longer than a single year. Secondly, the size of the HEP 
loans are disproportionately large (especially in Tigray) 
relative to the PSNP transfers, raising questions about 
the ethics and efficiency of assisting chronically poor 
and vulnerable people to escape from food insecurity 
by imposing onerous debt burdens on them.
For these and other reasons, take-up of the HEP has 
been slow, and the target of reaching 30% of PSNP house-
holds each year for 3 years looks unlikely to be reached. 
This is reminiscent of earlier experiences with agricultural 
input loans in the 1990s, when farmers were deterred 
by high interest rates and punitive repayment schedules. 
Payment was due immediately after harvest, forcing 
many farmers to sell food at low post-harvest prices 
(Vaitla and Zerihun, 2006a). As noted above, farmers who 
were unable to repay were often imprisoned, even in 
drought years when crop failure left them hungry and 
destitute.
Three other concerns with the HEP are worth 
mentioning. Firstly, skewed availability of certain pack-
ages means that household choices are often constrained, 
and quotas mean that preferred packages are often 
unavailable (Vaitla and Zerihun, 2006b). Many partici-
pants in Tigray, for instance, feel that beehives were 
imposed on them rather than freely chosen (Slater et al, 
2006). As a result, there is a real risk of flooding the market, 
in this case with honey. Secondly, delays in PSNP 
payments, or ‘rotation’ of households out of the PSNP, 
compromises the impact of the HEP assets and inputs, 
which might need to be liquidated for consumption 
needs (in the absence of PSNP cash transfers) rather than 
invested for income generation (Guenther, 2007).
Thirdly, available evidence reveals that Household 
Extension Packages were not well targeted, and even 
that the poorest households were systematically 
excluded. Our survey found that three in four packages 
were taken by households in the top two wealth quintiles 
(Devereux et al, 2006). Another study found that the 
poorest households were screened out of the programme 
due to a bad credit history or lack of land to absorb HEP 
livestock (Vaitla and Zerihun, 2006b). This skewed 
targeting is explained by skewed incentives. Staff are 
under pressure not only to recover the loans, but also to 
ensure that households ‘graduate’ rapidly out of food 
insecurity. This naturally leads to a selection bias towards 
households that are perceived as being creditworthy and 
have potential to generate income from the packages, 
rather than, say, labour-constrained households that are 
perceived as likely to default and unlikely to graduate.
Voluntary Resettlement Programme (VRP)
The thinking behind resettlement schemes can be under-
stood in terms of both social protection and agricultural 
policy goals. Facilitating the relocation of farming families 
from areas where land is constrained, agricultural produc-
tivity is low and agricultural risk is high, to areas where 
land is more abundant, agricultural productivity is poten-
tially higher and agricultural risk is lower, seems like an 
effective strategy for reducing vulnerability (a core social 
protection objective) and raising farm yields (a core agri-
cultural policy objective). While this sounds like a ‘win-win’ 
outcome in theory, in practice resettlement schemes in 
Africa have more often failed than succeeded, mainly 
because they are implemented too quickly with inade-
quate preparation (eg providing basic infrastructure and 
services at the relocation sites, and ensuring that ‘open’ 
land is not actually dry season grazing for pastoralists).
During and following the famine of 1984-85, the Derg 
regime imposed a forced resettlement policy on many 
communities in drought-prone highland areas of Ethiopia 
that were designated as unviable for agriculture-based 
livelihoods in the long term. This policy was justified as 
a technical response to a complex combination of chronic 
food insecurity and acute vulnerability to weather shocks 
that could not be solved in any other way, but many 
analysts believed it was motivated by political expedi-
ency. It caused great hardship and loss of life, and most 
people who were forcibly resettled returned home as 
soon as they could.
Resettlement is also a component of the Food Security 
Programme, but the emphasis this time is on volun-
teering rather than coercion. The ‘Voluntary Resettlement 
Programme’, also known as ‘Access to Improved Land’, 
aims to relieve environmental stress and population pres-
sure in the same vulnerable highland areas as before, by 
relocating a target total of 440,000 households or 2.2 
million people. Each settler household is supposed to 
be allocated a package of assistance that includes access 
rights to up to 2 hectares of fertile land, seed, oxen, hand 
tools, utensils, and food rations for the first eight months. 
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Mindful of the failures of previous resettlement initiatives, 
settler communities should be well served with essential 
social infrastructure, including a clean water supply, 
health post and feeder roads.
The VRP is controversial and donors have been reluc-
tant to support it, fearing the humanitarian consequences 
if it fails. Although some (critical) unauthorised reports 
have been written about the implementation and 
impacts of the resettlement programme, no officially 
sanctioned independent evaluation has yet been 
conducted of its impacts, either as a social protection 
mechanism or as an intervention to stimulate smallholder 
agriculture.
Other social protection 
interventions for Ethiopian 
smallholders
Other social protection interventions in Ethiopia that are 
directly or indirectly linked to smallholder agriculture 
include: disaster prevention and management, specifi-
cally a new ‘integrated drought risk management plan’; 
weather-indexed drought insurance; and a commodity 
exchange.
Disaster prevention and risk management
There is an unresolved debate in the social protection 
literature about the relationship between social protec-
tion and emergency responses, with some confusion 
over definitional boundaries. The consensus appears to 
be moving towards keeping the two concepts distinct, 
with the term ‘social protection’ being applied mainly to 
long-term predictable social transfers delivered by 
governments (eg social pensions or child support grants), 
in contrast to emergency relief which is typically 
short-term, ad hoc and can be delivered by a range of 
actors including international donors and NGOs (eg WFP). 
On the other hand, social insurance mechanisms such 
as weather-indexed crop insurance schemes (see below) 
are a central element of most standard definitions of 
social protection, perhaps because insurance implies a 
degree of predictability that is inevitably absent from 
humanitarian responses.
Moreover, there are efforts to construct comprehen-
sive ‘disaster risk management’ frameworks that point 
towards a convergence between the social protection 
and humanitarian policy sectors. In Ethiopia, agricultural 
policies and programmes are coordinated by the Ministry 
of Agriculture and Rural Development, social protection 
programmes for farmers (eg the PSNP) are delivered by 
the Food Security Coordination Office, but humanitarian 
relief for farmers is provided by the Disaster Prevention 
and Preparedness Commission. This division of roles and 
responsibilities has proved to be conceptually confused 
in theory and cumbersome and inefficient in practice.
The Government of Ethiopia is in the process of 
revising its Disaster Prevention and Management Policy, 
as part of a wide-ranging reform of Ethiopia’s prepared-
ness and response systems. This involves planning for 
emergency responses in both the food and (previously 
neglected) non-food sectors. In the food sector, the World 
Food Programme and other donors are developing a risk 
management strategy with the ambition of ensuring that 
Ethiopians affected by transitory food insecurity receive 
more predictable and timely relief in the event of weather 
shocks. This involves the development of an integrated 
risk management facility, with contingency funds and a 
weather-indexed insurance scheme. In the non-food 
sectors, a baseline assessment is being undertaken of 
humanitarian risks in the emergency aspects of health 
and nutrition, water and environmental sanitation, and 
agriculture and livestock.
This policy review and reform is motivated by the same 
recognition that underpins the Productive Safety Net 
Programme: that Ethiopia’s reliance on annual humani-
tarian appeals for financing ‘emergency relief programmes’ 
is concealing problems that are actually chronic and 
structural in nature, and should instead be addressed 
through multi-year, multi-sectoral strategies based on 
developmental approaches and principles. A recent 
commissioned report (Lautze, 2006) maps out a transition 
strategy to assist the Government, UN agencies and NGOs 
in moving towards a more holistic approach. The strategy 
includes financial restructuring in the health, food secu-
rity, and water and sanitation sectors, to encourage 
development initiatives to absorb a portion of the recur-
rent baseline vulnerability that is embedded within the 
annual appeal. The report also argues for the establish-
ment of permanent emergency offices in the Ministries 
of Health, Agriculture and Rural Development, and Water 
Resources. All of these measures imply reconceptualising 
‘developmental’ and ‘emergency’ responses for Ethiopian 
farmers as integrated and inextricable, rather than sepa-
rate and unrelated.
A specific outcome of this process is the development 
of an ‘integrated drought risk management plan’ for 
Ethiopia. The plan is to apply coordinated financial instru-
ments tailored to different levels of risk that farmers face, 
thereby enabling the Government and donor agencies 
to respond to livelihood stress and emergencies as effec-
tively and efficiently as possible – that is, to save lives 
and livelihoods at the lowest cost possible (WFP, 2007). 
In drought years, the PSNP should continue to provide 
for its 8.3 million chronically food insecure beneficiaries, 
while contingency finance and weather-indexed insur-
ance would provide for those not covered by the PSNP 
but facing acute food insecurity.
Mild to catastrophic drought events, which are esti-
mated to occur every three years, would be financed 
with a three-year Livelihood Protection Facility (LPF) 
combining: a contingency fund, contingent grant or 
contingent debt and the insurance component 
mentioned above (Figure 2). Only after these various 
disbursements are triggered and funds are exhausted, 
would a flash appeal be necessary (Hess et al., 2006; WFP, 
2007). The trigger for these various financial mechanisms 
is a software programme called ‘Livelihood Early 
Assessment and Protection’ (LEAP), which uses ground 
and satellite rainfall data to assess levels of drought risk 
throughout Ethiopia, estimates livelihood stress levels 
based on projected yield reduction, and then signals the 
amount of financial resources required (WFP, 2007).
Weather–indexed drought insurance
One innovative component of Ethiopia’s new approach 
to risk management is a weather-indexed insurance 
Working Paper 008 www.future-agricultures.org9
scheme. Ethiopian smallholders face persistent risks of 
drought against which they are unable to insure, due to 
missing insurance markets. Experience from other coun-
tries suggests that insurance delivers both social protec-
tion for farmers (a guaranteed safety net against harvest 
failure) and agricultural growth (confidence to take 
moderate risks such as investing in fertiliser or 
high-yielding varieties). Missing insurance markets is a 
common feature throughout Africa and is explained by 
such factors as low incomes of farming households, 
information asymmetries, moral hazard and the covariate 
nature of agricultural risks. Conventional crop insurance 
is impractical in such circumstances, but weather-indexed 
insurance avoids some of these difficulties (especially 
moral hazard and asymmetric information), by using an 
index based on the relationship between lack of rainfall, 
crop failure and humanitarian needs, verified by historical 
records.
In 2006 the World Food Programme launched the 
Ethiopia Drought Insurance pilot project, with the aim 
of assessing the feasibility of using a market-related 
instrument to finance drought risk in Ethiopia. WFP 
purchased a weather derivative from a European rein-
surer for US$ 930,000, which would provide a maximum 
payout of US$ 7.1m. The project uses an index derived 
from 10 years of rainfall data from 16 weather stations 
across Ethiopia, calibrated against the scale and cost of 
corresponding relief activities. Analysis of these data 
shows an 80% correlation between rainfall levels and 
the number of food aid beneficiaries in each year, 
suggesting that rainfall is a reliable objective indicator 
of drought-triggered vulnerability and social assistance 
needs. (On the other hand, receiving assistance might 
be less well correlated with actual needs – eligibility for 
relief is determined largely by whether beneficiaries 
received assistance last year: “Once you’re in, you’re in. 
If you’re not, regardless of how vulnerable you are, you 
have a much less likely shot of being in the system that 
is triggered by rainfall data” (Sue Lautze, pers. comm.).)
When total rainfall for the current agricultural season 
falls below a predetermined threshold in a given location, 
an immediate payout is triggered to finance relief activi-
ties, typically cash- or food-for-work projects. Payouts 
are calibrated such that severe rainfall deficits trigger 
larger payouts, ensuring that needs are comprehensively 
covered (Hess et al., 2006). This mechanism also ensures 
timely relief, since resources can be disbursed immedi-
ately after harvest, protecting household food consump-
tion and assets (Hess and Im, 2007). This is in contrast to 
initial experiences with the Productive Safety Net 
Programme, when transfers were often disbursed several 
months late, undermining its social protection role 
(Devereux et al., 2006; Slater et al., 2006; Guenther, 2007). 
In fact, no payouts were made from the derivative 
contract in the pilot year, as crop production in Ethiopia 
in 2006 was one of the best on record (Hess, et al, 2006). 
The sustainability of this project depends on whether 
donors and/or the government are willing to continue 
to pay the necessary premiums every year (Alderman 
and Haque, 2007).
Ethiopian Commodity Exchange (ECEX)
Prices of food staples in Ethiopia are highly volatile, due 
to erratic supplies and weakly integrated markets, 
reflected in high transport and transaction costs, which 
limit opportunities for smoothing prices through arbi-
trage across space (transport) and time (storage). Price 
volatility undermines both food security for consumers 
and incentives for food producers. Under the Derg 
regime, food trading was tightly controlled through the 
Agriculture Marketing Corporation (AMC); however, like 
many other African countries, Ethiopia underwent rapid 
market liberalisation in the 1990s, where prices controls 
were eliminated and the AMC was ‘downsized’. These 
reforms did not reduce food price volatility and have 
arguably exacerbated it (Gabre-Madhin, 2001). Market 
actors react sluggishly to signals of changes in food 
supply or demand, leaving producers highly vulnerable 
Figure 2. Ethiopia’s proposed integrated drought risk management plan
Source: WFP, 2007
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to food price collapses and consumers equally vulnerable 
to food price inflation. Following bumper harvests in 2001 
and 2002, for instance, grain prices collapsed by 80%, 
which undermined smallholder incomes and left 300,000 
tonnes of grain rotting in the fields because it was not 
profitable to harvest (Gabre-Madhin and Goggin, 2005; 
Jopson, 2007).
In an innovative attempt to address these high trans-
action costs, the Ethiopian government is working with 
the International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI) 
towards establishing an Ethiopian Commodity Exchange 
(ECEX), which is due to start trading in December 2007 
and will cover six crops: coffee, sesame, haricot beans, 
maize, teff and wheat. A commodity exchange performs 
three basic functions: (1) price transparency: enabling 
access for everyone to a neutral reference price; (2) price 
discovery: ensuring that demand and supply develop-
ments are easily reflected in price levels; (3) reduced 
transaction costs: making it easier to find buyers or 
suppliers through a centralised market-place. Commodity 
exchanges can also reduce price risk by trading in futures 
contracts, and the ECEX will aim to do this in the near 
future (Gabre-Madhin, 2006).
The Ethiopian Commodity Exchange is expected to 
reduce transaction costs by: (1) facilitating contact 
between buyers and sellers, (2) enabling centralised 
grading of products, (3) ensuring that contracts are 
enforceable, (4) providing a mechanism for price 
discovery, (5) simplifying transactions with standard 
contracts, and (6) transmitting information about prices 
and volumes which will be enabled through the instal-
lation of price tickers at 200 rural sites, giving farmers 
independent access to price information from the 
exchange in Addis Ababa. The reduction of transaction 
costs will enable various market actors, including small-
holders, to benefit from a higher share of the final price. 
Increased information about market prices will also 
increase the bargaining power of smallholder farmers 
and enable them to make better investment decisions. 
This in turn, would generate incentives for increased 
production. Moreover, if the exchange is linked to a nego-
tiable warehouse receipts system, this can also increase 
liquidity for farmers by facilitating access to credit 
borrowed against the receipt. At least on paper, the ECEX 
appears to be an excellent example of an intervention 
that has the potential to achieve both social protection 
and agricultural growth (i.e. livelihood protection plus 
livelihood promotion) in a single instrument.
Conclusion
Although the term ‘social protection’ is not used in 
Ethiopia, many policies and interventions that successive 
Governments have initiated to provide support to small 
farmers combine elements of both ‘livelihood protection’ 
and ‘livelihood promotion’. Convergence between social 
protection and agriculture comes from both sides, but 
finds its fullest realisation in approaches to food security, 
a defining policy agenda in Ethiopia for several decades. 
The term ‘food security’ embodies notions of both agri-
cultural growth (increased food production or income 
generation) and attention to improved risk management 
(stabilised food production). Food security policies in 
Ethiopia in the past have involved (1) agricultural policies 
and practices that reduce risk (eg crop diversification) 
and (2) safety net interventions that delivered social trans-
fers through public works while also stimulating agricul-
ture, either directly (eg vegetable gardens or watershed 
management) or indirectly (eg road construction for 
better access to input and output markets). More radi-
cally, two Ethiopian governments (the Derg in the 1980s 
and the EPRDF in the 2000s) have initiated resettlement 
programmes that relocated millions of small farmers from 
high-risk highlands to lower-risk lowlands, with the dual 
objectives of increasing agricultural production and 
reducing agricultural vulnerability. Although these inter-
ventions both failed, for a variety of social, political and 
technical reasons, they encapsulate genuine efforts at 
‘linking relief and development’, which is also a theme 
that is driving the new social protection agenda, with its 
emphasis on generating economic growth and poverty 
reduction through cash-based social transfers rather than 
food aid.
While positive synergies can certainly be obtained 
between social protection and agriculture (though unfor-
tunately these often exist more in theory and design 
than in implementation and achievement), negative 
synergies can occur if different objectives conflict with 
each other. Social protection for smallholders can under-
mine rather than stimulate smallholder production, and 
in Ethiopia this has been most striking in the case of rural 
public works programmes, which are often implemented 
at times of year that compete directly with on-farm labour 
requirements. As discussed earlier in this paper, the 
simplest way to avoid competition for scarce labour 
between public works and agriculture in poor farming 
households is to eliminate labour conditionalities from 
social protection interventions altogether. However, this 
recommendation is unlikely to find favour with the 
present Government of Ethiopia, given its preoccupation 
with minimising ‘dependency’, building a ‘self-help’ 
mentality, and ‘asset creation’ by and for communities.
Another non-negotiable issue for the Government of 
Ethiopia is land rights, but it is our view that land redis-
tributions (last implemented 15 years ago) combined 
with inflexibility around informal reallocation of land 
have constructed more of a ‘poverty trap’ than a ‘safety 
net’ for small farmers in Ethiopia’s high-risk highland 
agro-ecologies. There are many options for loosening 
allocation of land rights that stop short of full alienation 
and commercialisation, but which could free farmers to 
pursue more viable livelihoods elsewhere, and could 
release land to more productive use. These intermediate 
options (eg land registration, consolidation of frag-
mented plots and validation of an informal rental market 
that is already operating covertly) have the potential for 
positive synergies between livelihood ‘protection’ and 
‘promotion’ for small farmers.
A number of initiatives that are in the pipeline also 
have enormous potential to protect small farmers against 
the shocks that repeatedly thwart their efforts to make 
a living and threaten the lives of themselves and their 
families. As discussed in this paper, such initiatives include 
weather-indexed crop insurance, new attempts at inte-
grated approaches to disaster prevention and risk 
management, and the commodity exchange that is about 
to be launched. Together with the drive for agricultural 
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commercialisation and growth as embodied in ‘PASDEP’, 
these developments could transform agriculture in high-
land Ethiopia from a moribund and highly risky economic 
activity into a more secure sector that generates pro-poor 
growth and poverty reduction. 
Finally, the intervention that is receiving most atten-
tion and resources right now is the Productive Safety 
Net Programme. As discussed above, there is empirical 
evidence that recipients of cash transfers through the 
PSNP are using this income to reduce food consumption 
deficits in their families, as well as investing in farming, 
small enterprises and education of their children. But 
these investment effects are limited by the depth of 
poverty and food insecurity within recipient households, 
as well as by the small level and erratic disbursement of 
PSNP transfers. There is also little evidence to date that 
the assets created under PSNP public works are sustain-
able. Maximising the synergistic potential of the PSNP 
requires ensuring that transfers are predictable and 
sustained (as intended) and adjusted to reflect rising food 
prices, and that linkages to other sectors (mainly agri-
culture, off-farm livelihood activities, education and 
health) are strengthened. There is great potential in the 
PSNP, as with PASDEP and the other initiatives discussed 
in this paper, to achieve synergies between agriculture 
and social protection. Much depends on how effectively 
these innovative ideas and good intentions are imple-
mented in farming communities.
Table 4: Proportion of rural households severely 
affected by different shocks and stresses, 2005 
to 2007
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